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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
ST!l.TE OF UTAH 
DORIS C. RUCKER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 18991 
DALE E. RUCKER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE tlATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree and the adverse 
ruling on Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, the Honorable 
George E. Ballif, presiding. This appeal is pursuant to Rule 72 
of the Utah Rules of Civil .Procedure. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court below entered a default judgment and decree of 
divorce in the above-entitled matter on November 18, 1981. Sub-
sequently, appellant and respondent, by and through their then 
respective counsel, stipulated and agreed to set aside the default 
judgment in certain particulars. On December 23, 1982, the court 
a decree awarding respondent child support and items of 
rPa] and personal property. 
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On January 5, 1983, appellant moved the court to set as, 
the decree rendered on December 23, 1982, which motion was rl,, 
on January 26, 1983. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellar:t seeks a reversal of the denial of his Motion to. 
aside the default judgment and decree below and a remand tot· 
lower court for a trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 12, 1981, a hearing on a default proceeding in 
divorce action brought by respondent against Plaintiff was helc · 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable George E. BalL 
presiding. The court awarded respondent a decree of divorc, 
consistent with the respondent's complaint (R.20,28-30). 
Subsequently, respondent retained counsel and at that ti1° 
counsel for appellant and counsel for respondent stipulated ar.: 
agreed to set aside the default judgment with regard to certa; 
particulars (R.31). Initially, the court refused to sign tr. 
order based on the stipulation and agreement to set aside 
default judgment and decree (R.32). 
However, on Januray 26, 1982,counsel for appellant ar.. 
counsel for respondent met in informal conference in 
Ballif's chambers. The court granted the stipulation with regar. 
to the distribution of real and personal property, and ali;non· 
but left intact the decree of divorce divorcing appellant ' 
respondent, awarding to respondent the custocy of the part:' 
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minor child, and ordering appellant to pay child support for the 
minor child in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars monthly 
( F. 3 3) • 
On November 12, 1982, counsel for appellant, Nick Colessides, 
moved to withdraw as counsel, which motion was The court 
advised appellant to obtain the services of new counsel, and 
ordered the trial date of November 30, 1982 vacated, and reset the 
trial for January 5, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. (R.106) Mr. Collesides then 
sent appellant a letter, informing appellant of the trial date in 
the divorce action, January 5, 1983 (R.122). 
After Mr. Colessides' withdrawal, appellant contacted Wayne 
B. Watson about representing him. On or about December 29, 1982, 
appellant received a letter from Mr. Watson informing him that Mr. 
Watson would not be available to try the case on January 5, 1983, 
and also informing appellant that according to Mr. Watson's 
investigation, the date of January 5, 1983 was a firm trial 
setting (R.123). 
At no time did appellant receive any notice, either written 
or oral, of a change in the trial date (R.121). Notwithstanding 
the lack of notice to appellants, a trial in absentia was held on 
December 22, 1982, and appellant received a copy of the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in thi,s case on or about December 
30, 1983. It was appellant's intention to appear in this matter 
with counsel, and to defend his interests therein (R.121). 
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That there was confusion over the date of the trial iri 1 
matter is evident by the opening comments of the court on Dece· 
22, 1982: 
THE COURT: The matter that's before the Court this 
morning is Rucker vs. Rucker, Civil No. 58,308. 
This matter was noticed for hearing this morn-
ing at 9:30 a.m. A notice to that effect went out, 
according to the certificate in the file to both 
Richard L. Maxfield, Attorney at Law, Counsel for 
Plaintiff and Dale E. Rucker, who is, at this 
point, prose. His prior attorney withdrew. The 
Court allowed him to withdraw. Nick Colessides. 
The Minutes entry says that the trial was re-set 
for January 5th, 1983. Why do I see that? 
MRS. CHAPPLE (Deputy Clerk): Well, it was set for 
then. But you were going to be on vacation that 
week, so it was changed. (Tr.2) 
Though respondent testified at trial that appellant w: 
informed of the trial date of December 22, 1982, and that appe:-
lant had stated to her that he would be in court on that dat; 
such testimony was clearly without foundation (R.121). 
Appellant, on January S, 1983, moved the court to set a<" 
the judgment and decree entered after the trial in absentia, b2S' 
on the fact that his failure to appear at trial was due 
mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect, and furthe 
that he was prevented from appearing by the fraud, 
sentation, or other misconduct of respondent (R.115). This mot: .. 
was denied by the court (R.127). 
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.!\RGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
AND DECREE, WHERE APPELLANT'S FAiLURE TO APPEAR WAS 
THE RESULT OF SURPRISE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT; OR FRAUD 
OR MISREPRESENTATION OF OTHER PARTY. 
Rule 60 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
pertinent part, that: 
On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; ••• (3) fraud (whether heretofore denom-
inated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; ••• or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
Clearly, under this rule, the trial court should not act arbi-
trarily in denying a motion to set aside a default judgment, but 
should be generally indulgent toward permitting full inquiry and 
knowledge of disputes so they can be settled in conformity with 
law and justice. Mayhew y. Standard Gilsonite Co,,14 Utah 2d 
52, 376 P.2d 941. Further, this court held in Mayhew. fil.lm it 
is an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment 
where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the 
defendant's failure to appear and timely application is made to 
set aside. supporting its holding in Mavhew, ..s.J.!.l2.UL-• setting 
aside a definite judgment rendered in a trial court, this Court 
stated that 
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It is undoubtedly correct that the trial cour! 
is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion 
in granting or denying such motions. However, it i-
also true that the court cannot act arbitrarily u 
that regard, but should be generally indulgent 
toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of 
disputes so they can be settled advisedly and in 
conformity with law and justice, To clamp a 
judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without 
a hearing is obviously a harsh and oppressive thina. 
It is fundamental in our system of justice that 
party to a controversy should be afforded an 
opportunity to present his side of the case. [376 
P.2d at 952(footnotes omitted)] 
In Central Finance Company y. Kynaston, 22 Utah 2d 284, L 
P.2d 316 (1969), this court quoted with approval f" 
Mayhew.supra., in reversing the refusal of the trial court to,,-
aside a default judgment where defense counsel, in his verifie 
motion to set aside the default, attested that he had not recein 
notice of trial. Further, this court also vacated a defau:: 
judgment in Interstate-Excav..ating y. Agla Development, 611 P.: 
369 (1980). Io Interstate Excayating. 5Ju!_i;_a, appellant did nc 
receive notice of trial date from its attorney after::-
attorney's withdrawal from the case. The appellant did, howe'iE' 
immediately upon receipt of notice of default judgment, contac 
other counsel who thereafter proceeded with diligence to atta'. 
the default judgments. This court reasoned that under sc: 
circumstances the interests of justice would be best servPri' 
setting aside the default judgment. 
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Surely, then, under the instant facts, the default judgment 
rendered by the court below should be vacated. 
Appellant received letters from two separate attorneys, one 
of whom had previously represented him in the divorce action in 
the court below, and one whom appellant had contacted about 
representing him in the matter. Both letters stated that trial in 
the divorce action in the court below would be on January 5, 1983. 
Appellant relied on this information, and intended to appear with 
counsel on January 5, 1983 got trial, since he received no notice 
of the change in trial date. Once he received a copy of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree in the matter 
rendered after the default hearing of December 23, 1983 appellant 
timely moved to set aside the judgment. 
Therefore, consistent with this Court's decisions, 
appellant's mistake as to the date of the trial, based as it was 
on statements from two competent and able attorneys as to the 
trial date of January 5, 1983 being a firm date, was sufficient 
cause for setting aside the judgment and decree in the court 
below. The summary denial by the above court to set aside the 
judgment and decree was an abuse of discretion by that court. 
In y, Mountain View Memorial Estates, 17 Utah 2d 323, 
411 P.2d 129 (1966), this Court, in setting aside a default 
judgment and remanding the case for trial on the merits, described 
the policy behind liberal application of procedural rules allowing 
fer vacation of default judgments in holding that: 
9 
The object to be desired in this as in all cases 
the searching out of the truth and doing justice 
between the parties in regard to the 
between them. To carry out that purpose it is 
policy of the law to favor a trial on the merits and 
to afford both sides a full opportunity to present 
their evidence and contentions as to disputed issues 
so they may be disposed of on substantial rather than 
upon technical grounds. Accordingly courts should 
exercise caution in regard to default judgments and 
should be somewhat indulgent in setting them aside. 
In Helgesen v. Inyangum.i.£, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah, 1981), tr .. 
court held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusi; 
to set aside a default judgment, reasoning that: 
The decision to relieve a party from a final 
judgment under rule 60 (b) (1) is subject to the 
discretion of the trial court. But discretion 
should be exercised in furtherance of justice and 
should incline towards granting relief in a 
doubtful case to the end that the party may have a 
hearing. Y... D_.ix.Qn fu1.D..Q.h 1:..Q.., 12 3 Utah 416, 
260 P.2d 741 (1953). [636 P.2d at 1081] 
636 P.2d at 1081. 46 Arn. Jur. 2d, Judgments. 
Further, in .Mendenhall y. Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287 (Otar 
1980) this Court noted with approval the effect of Rule 60(b) 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
There is no doubt about the salutary purposes of 
Rule 60 (b) to redress any injustices that may have 
resulted because of excusable neglect, or the 
wrongs of an opposing party. Nor that Rule 60(bl 
should be liberally construed to effectuate that 
purpose. [610 P.2d at 1289.] 
While this Court has noted that this rule should be libenL 
applied, it has also held that for the trial court's refusal 
vacate a valid judgment to be an abuse of discreti0n, pub 
policy demands more than a mere statement the movant did not h3 
his day in court. Public policy demands that the movant show t'' 
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he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing 
by circumstances beyond his control. State in interest of 
Children y, Nulffenstein. 560 P.2d 331 (Utah, 1977). In the 
instant matter, appellant has met this burden, since his failure 
to appear in court on December 22, 1982 was due to his honest and 
excusable mistake of believing the erroneous information he 
received from two well-respected and well-qualified attorneys. 
This Court has also determined that, as a general 
proposition, one who seeks to vacate a default judgment must 
proffer some defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit as 
would justify a trial of the issue thus raised. Downey State Bank 
L.-.Major-Blakeney Corooration.545 P.2d 507 (Utah, 1976). The 
trial courts, in the default judgment and decree, awarded to 
respondent all of the properties formerly owned by appellant and 
respondent during their marriage. Certainly, were appellant 
allowed to proceed on the merits, his interests would be better 
defended, and there is a substantial probability that appellant 
would be awarded more than merely his automobiles, mechanic tools, 
retirement income, and personal effects and belongings. 
Not only would appellant's interests be better protected in a 
trial on the merits, but in addition, respondent would suffer no 
prejudice thereby. Respondent would be able to put on her 
evidence in an adversarial proceeding, and the matter would be 
determined in conformity with law and justice. 
under facts similar to those at issue here, the Oregon 
Supreme court, in Hanthorn y. Oliver, 51 P. 440 (Ore., 1897) set 
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as id e a default j u d gm en t 0 n g r 0 u n d s 0 f ex cu s ab 1 e m i st a k e an ci 
honest misunderstanding by the defendant. In Hanthorn. fill.£..L'i, 
defendant was informed by his counsel on Monday the case 
for Tuesday, and, believing that Tuesday of the next week 
intended, he attended at that time, and then, for the first tp; 
found that judgment had gone against him by default. 
Other jurisdictions also consistently regard acciden· 
surprise, or unavoidable casualty or misfortune as a sufficic·· 
ground to vacate a judgment. The New Mexico Supreme Court, 
Sp r i n g e r C o r po r a t i 5 l O P . 2 d 1 O 7 2 ( N • M • , 1 9 7' 
determined that "because courts universally favor trial on t;.' 
merits, slight abuse of discretion in refusing to set aside, 
defult judgment will often be sufficient to justify reversal 
the order," 510 P.2d at 1074, and that the trial court must app'· 
a liberal standard in determining (1) whether there is excusati' 
neglect and (2) whether the defendants have a meritorio,;• 
defense. 
In Schulman y. Bongberg-Whitney Electric. Inc., 645 P.2d f. 
(Nev., 1982) the Nevada Supreme Court held that the decision t 
grant or deny a motion to set aside a default judgment rests w1: 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and that such oecis· 
must not be arbitrary or cavalier but must be exercised witr 
guidelines established by the State Supreme Court. One of ti1ci 
guidelines is that cases should be heard on the merits whene.· 
possible. 
Appellant submits that since his complete reliance · 
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erroneous information provided him by two respected attorneys as 
to the date of his trial is reasonable justification or excuse for 
his failure to appear at trial on December 22, 1983, the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to set aside the 
default judgment and decree rendered after the trial held in 
Appellant's absence. 
In the alternative, appellant submits that his failure to 
appear at the trial on December 22, 1982 was due to the fraud, or 
misrepresentation of respondent. Respondent testified at the 
trial held in appellant's absence that appellant was informed of 
the December 22, 1982 trial date, and the appellant had stated to 
her that he would be in court on that date. Appellant, however, 
has by affidavit sworn that such statements are entirely without 
foundation. 
The only evidence as to appellant's knowledge of the date 
scheduled for the trial of this matter in the lower court other 
than the statements of appellant and respondent are the letters of 
Mr. Colessides and Mr. Watson to appellant, indicating that the 
date of trial was to be January 5, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. Of 
particular importance is the fact that the letter from Mr. Watson 
is dated December 27, 1982, five days after the trial in absentia 
was held and only nine days before January 5, 1983. Mr. Watson, 
in his letter, stated that he checked the date of trial, and found 
that January 5, 1983 was a firm setting. 
Respondent's testimony that appellant knew of the change in 
trial date is suspect, at very least, given both appellant's sworn 
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statement that he had no such knowledge, and the letters,, 
counsel that the January date was a cate. 
At the very least, given the liberal policy of this Cour 
setting aside default judgments where one party has not t 
allowed a hearing, appellant should be given the benefit oft. 
doubt here. Respondent's self-serving testimony as to appellanc 
knowledge of the change in trial date is uncorroborate' 
Appellant's sworn statement that he had no knowledge of the chanc' 
is corroborated by two letters from competent attorneys. 
Appellant submits that, given the strong possibilities th2· 
respondent misled the lower court and/or appellant to avo;: 
confrontation at trial, this court should set aside the defau:: 
judgment and decree rendered in the lower court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since appellant's failure to appear at the trial held in his 
0 osence on December 2 2, 19 82 is justifiable and was completely 
based on circumstances beyond his control, the denial by the trial 
court of appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment was 
an abuse of discretion. In the alternative appellant prays for 
relief based on the fraud or misrepresentation of respondent. 
For these reasons, appellant prays that this Court reverse 
the judgment below and remand the matter to the trial court for a 
trial on the merits. 
/ 
' 
I 
I 
Vernon F. Romney,/ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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